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Abstract
Healthcare workers are at risk of sharps injuries and subsequent infection from more than 40 bloodborne pathogens or species. Hepatitis B Virus 
(HBV), Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) together account for the vast majority of cases. The Directive 2010/32/EU 
“Prevention from sharp injuries in the hospital and healthcare sector”, issued to protect workers from these risks, requires an integrated approach 
to prevention including awareness-raising, education, training, elimination of unnecessary needles, safe procedures for sharps use and disposal, 
banning of recapping, vaccination, use of personal protective equipment, provision of safety-engineered devices, and appropriate surveillance, mo-
nitoring, response and follow-up.
As laboratories represent a high-risk setting both in the preanalytical and analytical phase, we reviewed accidents and prevention in this setting in 
the light of the new legislation.
Phlebotomy is the procedure carrying the highest risk of exposure and infection, involved in 30-50% of HIV and HCV cases detected in nationwide 
systems following accidental blood exposures implemented since the 1990s in Italy and France. In laboratories, problems in the management of 
sharps containers, recapping, needle disassembly by hand and blood transfer from syringes into tubes were observed and accounted for two-thirds 
of injuries. These accidents could be reduced through education and monitoring of behaviours, and introduction of medical devices incorporating 
safety-engineered protection mechanisms with appropriate training. Laboratory staff should be immunized against HBV, and know policies and 
procedures for the post-exposure management and prophylaxis. The management commitment to safety is crucial to ensure the necessary support 
to these changes.
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The Directive 2010/32/EU “Prevention from sharp 
injuries in the hospital and healthcare sector”, 
which was issued to protect healthcare workers 
(HCW) from the risk of occupational exposure and 
infection with bloodborne pathogens, came in ef-
fect on May 11 2013 (1); by this date Member States 
should have incorporated into national legislation 
and implemented its requirements, hopefully 
leading to a complete and coherent program for 
the prevention of needlesticks and sharps injuries 
(NSI) and of their consequences throughout Eu-
rope.
As laboratories represent a high-risk setting both 
in the preanalytical and analytical phase, we re-
viewed exposures and preventative measures in 
this setting in the light of the new legislation, start-
ing from the long-lasting, nationwide experiences 
of the study groups on occupational risk of expo-
sure and infection with bloodborne pathogens es-
tablished in Italy and France since the end of the 
1980s, following the first reports of cases of infec-
tion with Human Immunodeficiency Virus among 
HCW.
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At-risk procedures: a review of 
occupational cases of bloodborne 
exposure and infection in the health care 
and laboratory settings
Laboratory workers are exposed to a wide range 
of hazards during each stage of their work; collec-
tion, transport, processing, and analysis of patient 
specimens all represent critical opportunities for 
contamination or NSI in laboratory workers. How-
ever, some procedures carry an increased risk of 
occupational bloodborne pathogen transmission, 
namely those involving hollow-bore needle place-
ment in the source patient’s vein or artery such as 
phlebotomy, in which, if a NSI occurs, a larger vol-
ume of undiluted blood can be transferred there-
by increasing the likelihood of infection with hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV) (2) and hepati-
tis C virus (HCV) (3).
In Italy, within the ongoing active surveillance car-
ried out in the network of hospitals participating 
in the Italian Study Group for Occupational Risk of 
HIV Infection (Studio Italiano Rischio Occupazion-
ale da HIV, SIROH) program, of all occupational 
cases of HIV and HCV seroconversion following 
percutaneous exposures identified since 1986 and 
1992, respectively, almost half - two out of four for 
HIV and 16 out of 33 for HCV - were related to phle-
botomy (4); two of the HCV cases occurred in labo-
ratory workers. Moreover, one case of simultane-
ous occupational infection with HIV and HCV was 
documented in a housekeeper working in a medi-
cal biochemistry laboratory, who sustained a 
blood splash in the eyes despite the facial screen 
when disposing of open tubes containing residual 
blood (5).
In France, where a national surveillance of HIV and 
HCV occupational infections is performed by the 
Institut de Veille Sanitaire, 11 of 13 documented 
cases of HIV and 22 of 63 of HCV following a per-
cutaneous exposure were related to phlebotomy; 
additionally, 4 possible HIV cases, and 4 HCV cases, 
occurred in laboratory workers during specimens 
processing and analyzing (6).
Worldwide, out of 106 reported cases of docu-
mented and 238 possible occupational HIV infec-
tion identified in the literature as of December 
2002, 128 (37.2%) occurred in nurses, 42 (12.2%) in 
doctors, and 39 (11.3%) in phlebotomists, classified 
as ‘clinical’ laboratory workers in the United States 
(all other cases involving phlebotomists have been 
classified under nurses); non-clinical laboratory 
workers account for seven cases, mostly related to 
an exposure to concentrated virus. Of 77 docu-
mented cases for whom the exposure has been re-
ported in detail, 35 (45%) were related to phlebot-
omy: six doctors, 18 nurses/phlebotomists, 3 stu-
dent nurses, 8 unspecified (7).
Phlebotomy-related exposures and risk 
of injury for laboratory workers
Phlebotomy in Europe is most commonly per-
formed by nurses, as shown by the results of the 
European survey on phlebotomy practices (8), but 
also by laboratory technicians, junior doctors and 
specialized phlebotomists.
Whoever might be in charge of performing phle-
botomy, the frequency of associated NSI is high: 
one in six of the 75,426 percutaneous exposures re-
ported within the SIROH from January 1994 to June 
2013 were related to blood drawing (venous and ar-
terial sampling), with approximately one in five in-
volving a bloodborne-infected source (Table 1). 
Phlebotomy-related NSI are more frequent in the 
laboratory setting than in other areas. These acci-
dents involved mainly nurses in all areas except for 
the laboratory, where different categories perform 
phlebotomy and should consequently undergo 
specific training to prevent exposure. Moreover, a 
higher frequency of NSI with phlebotomy-related 
devices was observed in laboratory auxiliary person-
nel suggesting risks related to devices disposal.
Of 24,009 mucocutaneous exposures reported 
within the SIROH in the same period, 4% (N = 960) 
took place in the laboratory: 65% occurred while 
transporting and manipulating biological samples, 
6% while performing phlebotomy to the patient, 
14% while cleaning and decontaminating the en-
vironment. This suggests a low compliance with 
personal protective equipment: indeed, in most 
cases, the worker was only wearing gloves and a 
coat; eyewear was missing in 85% of cases (and of 
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Work area Overall injuries
Phlebotomy-related 
injuries
Personnel involved in phlebotomy-related injuries (%)
Nurses Doctors Laboratorytechnicians Housekeepers
Laboratory 1556 482 (31%) 40 30 20 8.2
Critical area 8662 1979 (23%) 74 21 2 2.5
Medical area 23947 4982 (21%) 78 18 <1 2.2
Surgical area 30684 2356 (8%) 88 6 <1 2.4
Other 10577 1599 (14%)
Total 75426 11398 (15.1%)
Table 1. Needlesticks and sharps injuries related to phlebotomy. Studio Italiano Rischio Occupazionale da HIV (SIROH) nationwide 
surveillance program, January 1994-June 2013 (SIROH internal report, June 2013).
the remaining 15%, more than half was represent-
ed by prescription glasses) and face protection to 
cover nose and mouth was present in 35% of cases 
(SIROH, internal report, June 2013).
In France, the incidence of accidental blood expo-
sure per 100 full-time equivalent positions (FTE) in 
nurses followed a decreasing trend due to the in-
troduction of preventive measures, from 32/100 
FTE in 1990 to 7/100 FTE in 2000 (9); data from the 
RAISIN national surveillance on 810 hospitals found 
a further decrease, with nurses reporting 4.4 per-
cutaneous exposures per 100 FTE in 2010. Howev-
er, these data derive mainly from the public sector, 
while data from the private sector, where phlebot-
omy is frequently performed by laboratory techni-
cians, are lacking. In a study carried out in 91 pri-
vate laboratories in 2005 by the Study Group on 
the Risk of Exposure for Healthcare Workers 
(Groupe d’Etude sur le Risque d’Exposition des 
Soignants, GERES), phlebotomists working in pri-
vate laboratories had a higher exposure rate dur-
ing venous blood sampling (11 per 100 phleboto-
mists/year) than nurses working in hospitals (7 per 
100 nurses/year). Observation of practices revealed 
that Standard Precautions were well known and 
observed except for wearing gloves (in only 5.5% 
of cases), while available, and that sharps contain-
ers were available in most laboratories (96%) and 
used in most cases consistently with good practic-
es (though 12% of containers were out of arm’s 
reach, and 10% were overfilled); however, high-risk 
practices were observed after blood collection: 
blood transferring in 15% of cases, needle disas-
sembly by hand in 10% of cases, and needle recap-
ping in 1% of cases (10).
An integrated approach to prevention: 
the Directive 2010/32/EU
In the European Union (EU), legislation to improve 
the safety and health of workers has been in place 
since 1989 (11). In 2000 a specific directive on work-
ers’ exposures to biological agents was issued, 
which included “design of work processes and en-
gineering control(s)” among its protective meas-
ures (12). On May 10, 2010, the European Council 
adopted Directive 2010/32/EU on “Prevention from 
sharp injuries in the hospital and healthcare sec-
tor”, issued to specifically protect HCW from the 
risk of occupational NSI and subsequent infection 
with HIV and other bloodborne pathogens (1). The 
Directive came in effect on May 11 2013, by which 
date all Member States should have incorporated 
its requirements into their national legislation and 
implemented its intended preventive interven-
tions as far as possible. This Directive is the result 
of the successful and fruitful dialogue between ex-
posed workers and healthcare employers, repre-
sented by the European sectoral social partner or-
ganizations – the European Public Services Union 
(EPSU) and the European Hospital and Healthcare 
Employers’ Association (HOSPEEM) – in a unique 
experience illustrated also in a video realized by 
the European Commission (13). Experts from the 
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SIROH provided data and expertise in support to 
the Social partners in the development of a frame-
work agreement requiring an integrated approach 
to prevention: awareness-raising, education, train-
ing, elimination of unnecessary needles, safe pro-
cedures for using and disposing of sharps, banning 
of recapping, vaccination, use of personal protec-
tive equipment, provision of medical devices in-
corporating safety-engineered protection mecha-
nisms, and appropriate surveillance, monitoring, 
response and follow-up of accidentally-exposed 
workers, are all necessary elements to create a saf-
er working environment for HCW, the “bricks” 
building up a wall against occupational risks.
The brick wall of safety
1. Awareness-raising
Raising awareness among HCW about the risks 
possibly deriving from their everyday activity is 
the first step to ensure they understand the reason 
for a strict adherence with preventive behaviours, 
which include safe procedures for using and dis-
posing of sharps, and banning of recapping.
Within the healthcare setting, the laboratory is one 
of the areas at highest risk for the biological haz-
ards present in clinical and research laboratories: 
more than 5000 cases of laboratory-associated in-
fections, acquired through different routes (inges-
tion, inoculation, inhalation, contamination of skin 
and mucous membranes), have been reported in 
the literature over the last 100 years with a mortal-
ity rate of approximately 4% (14).
The first reports of occupational infection from se-
rum hepatitis (later classified as most likely due to 
Hepatitis B Virus, HBV) emerged in the 1940s and 
involved blood bank workers, pathologists, and 
laboratory workers (15-17). These reports alerted 
investigators to the risk of occupational blood ex-
posures, subsequently confirmed to be significant: 
laboratory workers, along with surgeons, were 
among the most exposed professionals, with hep-
atitis being the third most frequent agent(s) of 159 
involved in laboratory-acquired infections (18). Of 
all the pathogens or diseases which determined 
an occupational illness following a NSI in a HCW, 
most involved also or exclusively the laboratory 
setting (Table 2) (19-22). However, it was the ap-
pearance of HIV which emphasized the urgent 
need for minimizing the risk of blood exposure 
during all phases of the laboratory process: HBV, 
HCV and HIV together account for the vast majori-
ty of cases of occupational infections in the health-
care and laboratory setting nowadays (19,23).
2. Safer use and disposal of needles
Considering the different phases of needle manip-
ulation, of the 11,398 phlebotomy-related expo-
sures reported in the SIROH, 6% occurred while re-
capping, 5% while disassembling the used device 
by hand, and 22% after use but before disposal: in 
summary, 33% of these exposures (more than 
3,700 injuries) could have been prevented by 
adopting a correct behavior in the manipulation 
and disposal of used devices. As shown by the 
GERES study in private laboratories, these incor-
rect behaviours were observed among phleboto-
mists, probably accounting for at least a quote of 
their higher injury rate per 100 FTE in comparison 
to nurses. Used needles should be immediately 
disposed of, following the completion of the pro-
cedure: disposing of used devices in a sharps con-
tainer all or most of the times was found to de-
crease the odds of sustaining a NSI of 82% (24).  
However, 24% of NSI in the laboratory reported in 
the SIROH occurred while disposing of the used 
device in the sharps container (18% of NSI in other 
areas), and 12% occurred with a device protruding 
from an overfilled container (3.3% of NSI in all oth-
er areas). These data as a whole might reflect prob-
lems in the management of sharps containers, 
supported by the observation of a 10% of over-
filled containers in the GERES study (10), but the 
frequent injuries at disposal also reflect the use of 
winged-steel needles for phlebotomy, very com-
mon in Italy but not in Europe: these devices ac-
count for 43% of injuries at disposal in the labora-
tory setting, because of their long tubing coiling in 
the so-called “cobra effect” (25).
Including also NSI with devices disposed of into in-
appropriate containers (1% on average), almost 
54% of overall phlebotomy-related exposures re-
ported in the SIROH, and 70% of those reported in 
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*cases of pathogens or diseases enlisted in italics involved also or exclusively laboratory workers.
Table 2. Cases of occupational infections and diseases acquired through a needle or sharps injury in healthcare and laboratory set-
tings, by year of first report in the literature* (19-22).
the laboratory setting, occurred after the proce-
dure had been completed, when the needle de-
vice had to be eliminated. The Directive states 
“Where the results of the risk assessment reveal a 
risk of injuries with a sharp and/or infection, work-
ers’ exposure must be eliminated by […] eliminat-
ing the unnecessary use of sharps by implement-
ing changes in practice and on the basis of the re-
sults of the risk assessment, providing medical de-
vices incorporating safety-engineered protection 
mechanisms” (1).
3. Elimination of unnecessary needles
Blood transfer from syringes into tubes represent 
an example of an unnecessary use of needles in 
the laboratory setting which could be eliminated: 
this practice was observed post-phlebotomy in 
15% of cases in the GERES study (10), and was the 
mechanism of 4% of phlebotomy-related NSI in 
the SIROH.
Of course, the elimination of unnecessary blood 
tests could have a more significant impact in de-
creasing phlebotomies and the consequent need 
to analyze the collected samples, thereby reduc-
ing the chances for NSI and mucocutaneous expo-
sures to occur. There are differences in the fre-
quency of requested blood tests between differ-
ent institutions, with one study demonstrating 
that teaching hospitals collect more samples (a 
wider follow-up of the patients or a greater 
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number of requests by inexperienced doctors?), 
but also detecting geographic differences which 
can only be explained by a different organizational 
culture (26). Establishing a good relationship be-
tween the clinicians and the laboratorians would 
result in a more appropriate request for blood 
tests, increasing their diagnostic power, and avoid-
ing unnecessary repetitions (27).
This relationship with the clinicians is one of the 
factors which should be considered in the stand-
ardization of the preanalytical process, which in 
turn could help in maintaining safer phlebotomy. 
Indeed, the preanalytical phase includes a set of 
processes that are difficult to define because they 
take place in different places and at different times. 
While quality control systems designed to ensure 
the quality of the analytical phase are highly de-
veloped and in use at most clinical laboratories, 
this is not the case for the preanalytical phase. Pre-
scription from many different clinicians, as well as 
outsourcing of the sampling process, could be 
some of the causes In the analytical phase, proc-
esses take place within the laboratory and involve 
few people; consequently, the variables that need 
to be monitored are limited and well defined. The 
preanalytical phase, in contrast, involves many 
processes, most of them external to the laborato-
ry; in addition, these processes are quite varied 
and involve many different people (patients, clini-
cians, phlebotomists, shippers, administrative per-
sonnel, and laboratory staff); as a result, these mul-
tiple variables, some difficult to define, must be 
monitored and managed by each laboratory.
Specifically regarding phlebotomy, the ISO 15189 
standard (28) indicates that the specific instruc-
tions for extracting and handling samples should 
be documented and implemented by laboratory 
management and readily available to the sampling 
supervisors. The manual for primary sample col-
lection must be part of the quality control docu-
mentation. This manual must contain instructions 
for, among others, procedures for collecting pri-
mary samples, and safe disposal of the materials 
used to obtain the samples (29); in these proce-
dures, indications could be provided regarding the 
appropriate choice of the device.
4. Provision of safety-engineered devices
The choice of the device to be used for phleboto-
my is of importance both for the safety of the pa-
tient- e.g. the use of catheters or small gauge nee-
dles may result in hemolytic specimens that might 
lead to an incorrect result - and that of the health-
care worker.
Provision of medical devices incorporating safety-
engineered protection mechanisms (safety-engi-
neered devices, SED) would significantly impact 
on all the exposures occurring after use: in a multi-
center prospective survey performed in 32 French 
hospitals, use of SED during phlebotomy proce-
dures was associated with a 74% lower risk of NSI, 
with the decrease in the NSI rate strongly correlat-
ing with increases in the frequency of SED use (9), 
in agreement with what has also been observed in 
the SIROH (30); a second survey in 66 French hos-
pitals demonstrated also a correlation with the de-
sign of the device, in particular with the need for 
user activation (31). Indeed, in the latter study al-
most 25% of NSI occurred between the end of the 
procedure and device disposal, owing to user fail-
ure to activate the safety feature; additionally, one-
third of NSI took place during activation of the 
safety feature, resulting from incorrect user activa-
tion of the safety mechanism rather than from fail-
ure of the device itself. This may be due to inade-
quate information and training of HCW. In a recent 
German study at the Heidelberg University Hospi-
tal, having a baseline injury rate of 69.0 per 1,000 
FTE, training was performed in all departments by 
the Occupational Health Service and was obliga-
tory for all healthcare personnel when the new 
safety devices were introduced: a significant de-
crease in injury rates was observed one year after 
introduction (52.4 per 1,000 FTE): overall NSI 
dropped by 22%, with a -46% for phlebotomy-re-
lated injuries adopting an user-activated device 
(32). At the University Hospital Birmingham Na-
tional Health Service Foundation Trust in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, in 2003, when only standard training 
was provided, the number of NSI was 20/100,000 
devices. However, the subsequent introduction of 
three safety needle devices, including phlebotomy 
needles, with concomitant training resulted in a 
significant reduction in the number of reported 
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NSI to 6/100,000 devices in 2004 (33). In a Spanish 
general hospital, a program was implemented for 
the use of engineered devices to prevent percuta-
neous injury in the emergency department and 
half of the hospital wards during several at-risk 
procedures, including vacuum phlebotomy and 
blood-gas sampling; the program included a 
course on occupationally acquired bloodborne in-
fections, and “hands-on” training session with the 
devices. A 93% reduction was obtained in the rela-
tive risk of percutaneous injuries in areas where 
safety devices were used (14 vs. 1 percutaneous in-
jury), demonstrating that proper use of engineered 
devices is a highly effective measure to prevent 
NSI among HCW, however, education and training 
are the keys to achieving the greatest preventative 
effect (34).
5. Education and training
Education and specific training are of utmost im-
portance in decreasing occupational risks of per-
cutaneous and mucocutaneous exposure to blood 
and body fluids (35). Education played an impor-
tant role in decreasing NSI rates in the past, when 
SED were not available, as it decreased recapping, 
unnecessary needle manipulation and improper 
disposal of used devices (36,37). More recently, 
when educational programmes were implement-
ed alongside a SED, lower rates of sharps injuries 
were sustained for longer, but the benefit attribut-
able to education alone could not be isolated from 
the impact of the introduction of the safer device 
(38). Nonetheless, any change, to obtain significant 
results, should be accompanied by an educational 
intervention, illustrating the rationale and conse-
quences of the change. This intervention should 
then be repeated over time and accompanied by a 
monitoring of adherence to the change, to ensure 
that the objectives were achieved and maintained 
(39). Among laboratory personnel, periodic renew-
al of biosafety training may be important in rein-
forcing institutional safety expectations and pro-
viding an opportunity to review new safety meas-
ures, such as the adoption of new devices incorpo-
rating a protection mechanism, as well as remind-
ing about “old” safety measures, such as wearing 
personal protective equipment appropriate for the 
activity to be carried out. This is even more impor-
tant because the whole workforce, in healthcare 
and in laboratories, is ageing. The Fourth Europe-
an Working Conditions Survey highlights specific 
problems encountered by ageing workers in the 
workplace. Particularly, the survey shows that 
workers aged 45–55 report higher exposure to 
risks during their working activity and that older 
workers receive less training and have more limit-
ed access to new technologies than younger work-
ers. On the basis of these findings, access to train-
ing especially for older workers, need to be further 
ensured and encouraged (40).
This is crucial to increase adherence with infection 
control precautions - including a consistent use of 
personal protective equipment - of great impor-
tance in every healthcare activity but particularly 
in the laboratory setting. Indeed, the concern for 
the prevention of injuries and occupational infec-
tions in U.S. laboratories prompted the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention to issue specific 
guidelines for the diagnostic laboratories in hu-
man (and animal) medicine, in which quality labo-
ratory science is reinforced by a common-sense 
approach to biosafety in day-to-day activities (41), 
supplementing the reference manual “Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories” (BM-
BL-5).
6. Vaccination against Hepatitis B
Among the many issues regarding all the activities 
carrying a risk, from sample collection to the use 
of technology and the exposure to physical and 
chemical agents, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention guidelines repeatedly address the 
need for hepatitis B vaccination of exposed work-
ers, and for maintaining a record of vaccination, 
also required in the ISO 15189 (28).
A survey conducted in laboratories across Canada 
found that 15% of respondents reported incom-
plete hepatitis B vaccination (42). Before wide-
spread HBV vaccination was in use, pathologists, 
blood bank personnel and laboratory technicians 
had the highest cumulative prevalence of all HBV 
serologic markers among all occupational catego-
ries in hospitals (≥ 25%) (43,44), confirming that 
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laboratory staff should be encouraged to start or 
complete a standard HBV vaccination cycle early 
during education or at least at employment. Ac-
cording to the Directive requirements, vaccination 
must be offered free of charge to all workers and 
students, and workers must be informed of the 
benefits and drawbacks of both vaccination and 
non-vaccination. This latter aspect is particularly 
important, because incorrect or incomplete infor-
mation may hinder acceptance or completion of 
vaccination (45).
7. Reporting and recording
Notwithstanding all preventive interventions, acci-
dents still may occur. Clearly, a surveillance of oc-
cupational exposures should be activated in every 
healthcare setting to monitor injuries and contam-
inations and identify the need for corrective inter-
ventions: a “no blame culture”, as stated in the Di-
rective, should be in place to encourage report-
ing.
Indeed, incidents, for the Swiss cheese theory, are 
always the final result of a series of “holes” - struc-
tural, administrative, technological and behaviour-
al, which align, allowing for the injury to occur: the 
final responsibility should not lie on the exposed 
worker only. As reminded in the Directive, “Inci-
dent reporting procedure should focus on system-
ic factors rather than individual mistakes” (1).
According to the Directive, reporting mechanisms 
should include local, national and European-wide 
systems: in Italy and France, local merging into na-
tional systems are in place, in Spain there are re-
gional systems, in the UK systems involve Trusts; 
there are several good systems which can be tak-
en as examples or adopted, for those facilities 
wishing to implement a local reporting system to 
collect data to be used for preventive, administra-
tive and educational purposes (46).
In the Directive, it is stated that monitoring (i.e. 
close observation of the evolving risks, changes in 
procedures, in behaviours, new technologies) is a 
responsibility of the health employer, as well as 
encouraging and facilitating HCW participation in 
educational courses, and providing personal pro-
tective equipment and safety devices as appropri-
ate and whenever available; HCW, in turn, must at-
tend these courses and comply with prevention 
requirements.
8. Response and follow-up: post-exposure 
management
Monitoring also indicates the need and duty of the 
employer to fully record every accident and pro-
vide a follow up of the injured worker after the ex-
posure, for which event a response (policies and 
procedures for the post-exposure management, 
immediate steps for the care of the injured worker, 
availability of post-exposure prophylaxis) must be 
in place and well known by the HCW. In case of ex-
posure, a risk assessment should be rapidly per-
formed by another appropriate health profession-
al to decide if a significant exposure has occurred 
and if there were factors increasing the risk of 
transmission of bloodborne viruses infection; to 
investigate the serostatus of the source, if known, 
or if the source is unknown or refuses testing, to 
assess the risk based on the characteristics of the 
exposure and any available information; to ascer-
tain the HBV immunisation status of the exposed 
HCW and finally to decide immediate post-expo-
sure actions like Hepatitis B and HIV post-exposure 
prophylaxis (47).
The risk assessment should first consider the likeli-
hood of HIV, HBV and HCV transmission, but if the 
source is infected with other agents, these should 
be taken into account in the post-exposure evalu-
ation and follow up.
Blood is the body fluid most frequently involved in 
occupational cases of infection, but other fluids 
containing the agent(s) (e.g., cerebrospinal fluid, 
pleural fluid) could also represent a risk. Percuta-
neous exposures carry a higher risk than mucous 
contaminations; however, the conjunctiva is also a 
frequent portal of entry for pathogens.
The average risk of HIV infection following a NSI 
with an HIV-infected, untreated source is < 0.5% 
(48); a deep injury, with a hollow-bore, blood-filled 
needle may however carry a 10-fold higher risk, 
further enhanced according to the source viral 
load (2). Antiretroviral post-exposure prophylaxis 
(PEP) may protect the HCW against HIV. PEP should 
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be started as soon as possible, ideally within one 
hour from exposure, and the risks re-evaluated af-
ter the results of HIV testing of source patient, per-
formed with informed consent, are available; ex-
pert consultation should be available within 48-72 
hours in any case (49,50).
If the HCW is susceptible for HBV or the specific re-
sponse to previous vaccination is unknown, and 
the exposure involves a HBsAg positive or un-
known patient, a dose of HBV vaccine should be 
provided as soon as possible, within 1-7 days, and 
then the situation re-evaluated by an expert with 
the serostatus of the source and the exposed 
worker; specific immune globulins may be indicat-
ed, one dose as soon as possible repeated after 
one month, for unvaccinated and not immune or 
non-responder HCW (51). In the absence of any 
post-exposure intervention, the risk of acute hepa-
titis B following a NSI with an HBsAg positive pa-
tient is estimated to average 5%, and that of sero-
conversion could reach 30%; these probabilities 
are higher if the source is also HBeAg positive (52).
The average risk of HCV transmission after a NSI is 
< 1% (53); the same factors identified to increase 
the possibility of HIV transmission (depth of the in-
jury, presence of visible blood on the device, 
source viral load) significantly heighten this rate 
(3). So far, neither primary nor secondary prophy-
laxis are available; however, in case of infection, 
early treatment (during the acute or early chronic 
phase) has been observed to clear the infection in 
> 90% of cases (54,55); therefore, early identifica-
tion of cases is desirable, and the follow up should 
be performed accordingly (56).
In any case, regardless of related risks, the psycho-
logical impact of an occupational exposure can be 
significant; the emotional distress for the exposed 
worker and relatives should be addressed in the 
post-exposure management, and further conse-
quences prevented with appropriate counseling 
and support (57).
Conclusions
The safety of patients being paramount, and al-
ways bearing in mind that the primary goal of 
healthcare and laboratory procedures is the opti-
mal care and well-being of the patient, the HCW 
should nonetheless be second in line. Transition-
ing to safer working practices may represent a 
great effort at the beginning, but entail significant 
results in the end. In this effort, the management 
commitment to safety is crucial to ensure the nec-
essary support to these changes, including re-
sources for education and training, the provision 
of safer materials, and adequate monitoring; at the 
same time, the HCW must perceive, and believe in, 
the management commitment to safety. If the or-
ganization is determined to pursue the adherence 
of workers to safe work practices, its workers are 
more likely to meet the standards: this virtuous cy-
cle leads to a strong institutional safety climate, 
entailing a significant decrease of risks for HCW.
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